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British and Lebanese Prisons: Are They Fertile Breeding
Ground for Terrorism?
Abstract
Within an antagonistic atmosphere, radicalism becomes an attractive path for young
Muslim inmates who feel disaffected. This is especially the case for those who are easily
manipulated emotionally, due to being separated from friends and family. Radicalism makes
them feel like they are in the “right” place. This article contrasts the radicalization
processes occurring within United Kingdom prisons with those occurring in Lebanese
prisons. Prisons are frequently designated as the “hotbeds” of radicalization, violent
extremism, and terrorism, but in the United Kingdom, they are seen more as “homegrown”
terrorist plots. Focusing solely on security is insufficient to prevent radicalization. Instead,
an approach is needed that not only strengthens the legal framework, but is grounded in
wisdom and justice, as otherwise further anti-Muslim backlash to terror attacks will only
drive more terrorist attacks.
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INTRODUCTION
The current European economic crisis hit particularly hard the Muslim
population. For instance, the unemployment rate for young Muslims is
extremely high in many parts of Europe. The UK is facing more difficulties
than other European countries because it is currently the top destination
country for Muslim migrants. For instance, the UK received 43% of all
Muslim migrants between mid-2010 and mid-2016. Many of these young
Muslim migrants now feel alienated, disenfranchised, and resentful due to
perceived frequent discrimination against Muslims in the job market.
Because of perceived unequal opportunities and a lack of social
integration, some extremists are spreading their ideology and attempting
to recruit new Islamic followers to save Islam from European attacks.
Recruiters practice variant ways in radicalizing new followers but they
have consistently used mosques, gyms, and university Islamic associations
as places to spot potential recruits. Usually, they process aside, away from
the view of the community, such as in prisons, and radicalized in a one-onone or small-group setting.
In such an environment, many prisoners have a strong desire to develop
a need for belonging, group identity, protection, and religious guidance.
A July 5, 2016 report, submitted to the French National Assembly,
suggests, “Everyone knows… prison is one of the soils of radicalization.”
Incarceration gives many young Muslims the “opportunity to be exposed
to radical discourse and to become involved in radical political or even
militant activity.”

Historical Overview
The history of prison Islamic radicalization began in Turkey, Egypt, Syria,
Jordan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Lebanon. Islamist extremists in the Arab
world have repeatedly used prisons to recruit new followers and graduate
some of the most dangerous people known sometimes to intelligence
agencies. For instance, Sayyid Qutb, leader of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s, wrote his influential radical book
“Milestones” whilst in prison. In addition, Ayman al Zawahiri, the current
leader of Al-Qaeda and a former student of Qutb, during his time in prison
in the 1980s, became a hardened radical and recognized leader for Islamic
militant beliefs, where he taught radical understanding of Islamic theology
and Islamic history in various prisons. Likewise, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
spent most of his time under United States detention in the infamous Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq and after his release became the leader of the Islamic
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State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL). In addition, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi during his
imprisonment in Jordan, became a powerful leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq,
and even recruited followers in prison. Due to the control, these and other
Islamists have gained over inmates and guards in prisons, petty criminals
have been recruited by and transformed into jihadists.
Connection between Religion and Radicalism
As a sociological phenomenon, issues such as belonging, identity,
group dynamics, and values are important elements in the radicalization
transformation process. The French political scientist Olivier Roy believes
that suicide terrorism and organizations such as al-Qaida and ISIS are
new in the history of the Muslim world and the rise of fundamentalism
doesn’t explain it. He points out that terrorism does not arise from the
radicalization of Islam, but from the Islamization of radicalism.
In contrast, wars in the Muslim heartland and foreign policy issues
are not the only suggested triggers for radicalization. British counterextremism James Bradon reminds us “detained Irish Republican Army
(IRA) men swiftly turned a number of prisons in the United Kingdom
into centers of radicalization and propaganda.” He views prisons,
particularly in the United Kingdom, more as “homegrown” terrorist plots
than any other Western country. Robert Mueller III, Director of Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) goes so far as to suggest that prisons are
fertile grounds for radicalization. He argues prisoners “may be drawn
to an extreme form of Islam because it might help justify their violent
tendencies.”
Criminologist Harvey Kushner believes, Western prisons are one of the
main recruitment grounds for Al Qaeda. Not surprisingly, Dame Anne
Owers, former Chief Inspector of Prisons in the United Kingdom, suggests
that police should spend greater focus on converts to Islam, as supposed
to be at far greater risk of radicalization than other Muslims are. Babar
Ahmed, detained in the United Kingdom while appealing extradition to the
United States on charges of running pro-jihadist websites, has meanwhile
described prison as a “university of Islamic knowledge.”
Keys Factors for Prison Radicalization
Socio-economic deprivation, including low education attainment,
unemployment, and underemployment, are amongst the most common,
as well as most contested, explanations for radicalization in general. But,
isolation from the outside world, a perceived sense of victimization, the
need for belonging, a sense of vulnerability, and prolonged exposure to
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radical individuals, are all believed to be contributed factors for prison
radicalization. Which means that socio-economic frustration and lack of
self-fulfillment, along with bitter experiences of racism, discrimination,
and Islamophobia can trigger violent radicalization. This enlightenment
might lead to economist Gary Becker’s theory that “the greater amount
of human capital a person accumulates, the less likely that person is to
commit crime.”
David Snow and Scott Byrd write that it is fallacious to consider ideology
as “tightly coupled, inelastic set of values, beliefs, and ideas.” In fact,
prisons offer radicalizers an ideal atmosphere for introducing their
extreme ideologies and doctrines by playing on certain prisoners concerns
and feelings to gain their trust, garner their support, and recruit them into
their group. It is more likely to begin through such personal relationships
rather than through a ranting, wild-eyed extremist “brainwashing” an
unwilling audience.
In the United Kingdom, some imprisoned Islamists have adopted a
proactive strategy to capitalize on this uncertainty by offering food,
friendship, and spiritual support to new arrivals in prison. Lebanon uses a
similar approach where the influential prisoners offer a secure ambiance
for new prisoners in order to obtain their trust. They demonstrate a route
out of isolation, creating a sense of involvement in a wider project, and
presenting a vision of a promised victory. Extremists are making the most
of these circumstances by contacting and recruiting non-radicalized
prisoners. Hence, according to Olivier Roy,
“prison amplifies many of the factors that fuel contemporary
radicalization: the generational dimension; revolt against the system;
the formation of a tight-knit group; the search for dignity related to
respect for the norm; and the reinterpretation of crime as legitimate
political protest.”
There have been a number of cases of young men, often imprisoned
because of crimes committed in gangs, converting to radical Islam while
in prison. Joining Islamist groups gives some of these converts the sense
of comradeship and purpose that they had outside prison, contributing
to the drowned individuals into radical groups inside prison. Furthermore,
it is not always clear whether an individual’s radicalization took place
in prison or happened before. Take, for example, the case of Richard
Reid, the “shoe bomber” who attempted to blow himself on board a
transatlantic flight in 2001; he converted to Islam while imprisoned at
a Young Offenders Institution in England, but many believe that his
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1691
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interest in Al Qaeda only started when he became involved with a group
of extremists at Brixton Mosque. However, not all people who convert to
Islam in prisons are becoming radicalized and not every radicalized is a
terrorist.
British Profiles
There is increasing evidence of the process of radicalization inside
British prisons. Examples include Michael Coe who went into prison
as a gangster and left as Mikael Ibrahim, a convert to Islam acting as a
minder for Anjem Choudary. Likewise, Kevin Gardner later recognized as
Abbas Shafiq, who turned towards extremism during his stay at a Young
Offenders’ Institution in England in 2006-07. He became obsessed with
the British Army and plotted an attack on a military base from within
his cell. As well, Jordan Horner known as Jamaledin, jailed in December
2013 for trying to bring Sharia Law to the streets of east London. He
claimed that he was able convert dangerous, hardened criminals during
his time in prison. Horner said that he found prisons fertile ground for his
extreme understanding of Islam and suggested that prison guards were
“powerless” to prevent his activities.
The recent Westminster killer Khalid Masood is suspected to have been
radicalized in prison. His actions led Durham Frankland Prison in summer
2017 to begin the creation of a separate block for terrorism related
prisoners. The prison authority design this block, referred to as a “jihadi
jail,” to prevent the radicalization of inmates. Can similar models (a
“Guantanamo UK or Abu Ghraib Lebanon”) be adapted into the UK and/or
Lebanon?
Lebanese Profiles
According to Lebanon 2017 Human Rights report, there were
approximately 6,330 prisoners, including 4,097 pre-trial detainees and
remanded prisoners, in facilities built to hold 3,500 inmates. Roumieh
prison is the largest prison in Lebanon and holds 1050 inmates.
Unfortunately, as of 2017 it is extremely overcrowded and operating
at about 300% capacity which represents nearly half the prisoners in
Lebanon. For instance, the placement of 1100 prisoners with a maximum
capacity of 400, extremely overcrowded the separate block of the
Islamist extremist. This overcrowding, the poor conditions of the prison
and the lack of the judicial system where detainees spent one year
on average in pre-trial detention prior to sentencing, were supportive
circumstances for Islamic extremists to conduct a mutiny in 2015. This in
turn led to disorder and the establishment of alliances between terrorists
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and ordinary prisoners. A revolt occurred after the prisoners managed to
steal the master key from a guard, kidnapping 12 others, two doctors and
holding them ransom demands to negotiate with the government. This
caused an intervention from Special Forces in the Internal Security forces
(ISF) in Lebanon to remove such uprising of terrorist forces.
These prisoners pose a serious challenge to safety and security in
Lebanon. Hence, the Lebanese Interior Minister believes Roumieh prison
plays an infamous role in the recruitment of terrorists, confirming,
“Roumieh prison is an operations room for ISIS.” Shortly in 2015,
extremists organizes a suicide attack perpetrated in North Lebanon from
within the prison. A raid two days later exposed mobile and satellite
phones, computers, and even video conferencing capabilities in the
Islamist Bloc in Roumieh Prison.A similar case happened later in Britain,
where an imprisoned supporter of Al Qaeda used a mobile phone to direct
the construction of an extremist website. Prisoners of a segregation unit
holding convicted terrorists used a “linked system” of pipework to move
the contraband devices (encased in waterproof bags) passed by inmates
from one cell to another at HMP Whitemoor in Cambridgeshire.
Why focus on the UK and Lebanon?
This article contrasts marginalization and radicalization in Lebanon with
what it is happening in the United Kingdom. Lebanon play an immense
role due to its importance thoroughfare for extremists from Syria and Iraq
to Europe. Alistair Burt, British Minister of State for the Middle East and
North Africa stated in June 2018:
“Lebanon security is United Kingdom security. I am pleased to be
back in Lebanon and see how the UK, as a strong supporter of
Lebanon, is delivering its commitment to stand shoulder to shoulder
with Lebanon now and into the future.”
This statement highlights the importance of this comparative research,
because the Lebanese and British authorities are facing a substantial
challenge, one that does not respect borders, especially after the start of
the Syrian war in 2011.
Furthermore, comparing prison radicalization rates across these two
countries has many challenges, especially due to the differences in
legal systems, culture, language, environment, and many others factors.
For example, Foley argues that the United Kingdom has continued to
try terrorism cases through the ordinary courts, but has introduced
considerable and controversial powers, such as control orders, which
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1691
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“allowed the authorities to exercise extensive control over terrorist
suspects without bringing them to trial.” In contrast, the Lebanese judicial
system follows a trial procedure for terrorism applied by military judges in
front of special courts called “military courts,” which have no equivalent in
the English legal system.
In 2015, a military court sentenced the radical cleric Omar Bakri
Mohammed (who fled Britain in 2005) for three years in Lebanon. His
“voice” Anjem Choudary, who was urging support for ISIS, got jailed in
2016 for five-and-a-half years in the United Kingdom. Prisons authorities
face serious difficulties managing such prisoners, as currently inside
prisons the risk of extremism recruitment is substantial and produces an
extremely violent mind-set. Consequently, there is a need to focus on the
following question: What is the destiny of such prisoners when they will
be released?
A case study from the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) in 2018,
reported a 23 years old male released after three years of imprisonment
at Roumieh prison for joining Daesh. On release, his relative asked him
to carry out a terrorist attack against the Lebanese army in the north of
Lebanon and on a Church, promising to provide him weapons and an
explosive belt from Syria via Wadi-Khaled, Lebanon.

SOLUTIONS
Deradicalization
There are many perspectives of deradicalization. For instance, the United
Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Working Group
on Radicalization and Extremism describes deradicalization as “programs
that are generally directed against individuals who have become radical
with the aim of reintegrating them into society or at least dissuading them
from violence.” In his seminal 2009 work, Walking Away from Terrorism as
Horgan defines deradicalization in a different manner:
“The social and psychological process whereby an individual’s
commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced
to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and
engagement in violent activity.”
Hence, prisons are important vectors in the process of radicalization and
they mostly leveraged in the fight against it. For instance, Babar Ahmed
has written of reading Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones while in prison. This book
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is manifestly unsuitable for terrorist suspects might support any radical
ideologies propagated in prison by extremist inmates.
Radicalization has no simple cause and effect. The perpetrators come
from all areas of society, and it is difficult to predict who may be
vulnerable to radicalization. Nevertheless, the following potential strategy,
preventing young people from entering the radicalization process in the
first place might be efficacious. In an attempt to protect children from
the risk of radicalization, the British government in 2015 imposed on all
schools a Prevent duty under Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and
Security Act 2015. Though the UK Government has expressed its desire
for controversial topics to be debated in classrooms, it is also mandatory
for teachers to refer children for “deradicalization” for bringing up their
“concern about British policy in the Middle East” as a potential sign of
radicalization. There are also, right wing extremist (RWE) disengagement
programs run in Germany, France, Netherlands and Sweden. The
Lebanese government, however, has not currently implemented any
similar strategies.
Professor Bjorgo interviewed former right-wing extremists and found
that there are two universal factors involved in disengagement and
deradicalization. These are classified as push factors or pull factors. “Push”
factors includes doubting and disillusionment from the group’s ideology,
becoming uncomfortable with the brutality of the violence involved, loss
of status from the group and burnout. “Pull” factors includes age, fatigue,
maturity, greater freedom, not well accepted in the wider community, and
leaving to establish a personal relationship and/or family.
In May 2015, the Council of Europe launched a three-year action plan
to counter violent extremism and radicalization, in particular in schools,
prisons, and on the Internet. In this context, the Committee of Ministers
adopted guidelines to help member States of the European Union prevent
radicalization of prisoners and probationers and rehabilitate individuals
who have already been radicalized. For instance, the Channel program in
the UK (technically counter-radicalization) known as a deradicalization
program despite extremist violence not having taken place. It focusses
on the ideology of those referred to it, who moves through a series
of interventions by officials. Prison-based deradicalization programs
range from informal “chats” between prisoners and imams, to two-week
intense “courses” teaching prisoners the basics of Islam, to a years-long
integrated program.
For nearly social prevention programs should address progressively the
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1691
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idea that the risk of radicalization potentially leading to violent actions.
For instance, International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) Vice-President
Christine Beerli notes, “many States are developing and implementing
various domestic plans to address the root causes of this phenomenon.”
These states are referring such programs to as preventing or countering
violent extremism (P/CVE). On the other hand, it is argued that current
deradicalization programs focus largely on ideological factors and are
unlikely to be effective in achieving participant’s disengagement. Whether
these programs are sufficient to counter radicalization leading to terrorism
is presently unknown.
A concentration of radicalized prisoners may result in accusations of
racism, prejudice, and profiling, but would also lessen the likelihood of
radicalization of other prisoners. Alternatively, spreading inmates with
extremist views throughout the prison system may weaken the strength
of the individuals, by removing their support networks. However, it may
result in the radicalization of other individuals and thus lead to even
greater levels of radicalization. The practice of combating radicalization
consolidates the perception that fanatical religious ideology causes
terrorism and that the holding of radical ideas within a society is the only
detrimental attribute. Efforts to keep individuals from engaging in radical
violence are much more focused on the prevention of radical ideologies
and encouraging the integration of “at-risk communities” (which are
primarily taken to be “Muslim communities”).

CONCLUSION
Radicalism inside prison raises the threat of attacks from unknown
parties. Most people involved in terrorist attacks appear normal,
unremarkable and sometimes intelligence agencies know of these
people. Hence, it is important to ask, is our government taking the
right precautions to avoid the development of radicalization, especially
inside prisons? Likewise, we should all question whether it is ideal to
distribute extremists across a number of prisons so that their influence
and provision is reduced.
While the political landscape and policies in Europe are diverse, across
the continent the patterns of radicalization are familiar. Cases of
radicalization in prison are rising and prison environments is linking
extremist attacks. The United Nations General Assembly adopted in its
sixtieth session a resolution containing the United Nations Global CounterTerrorism Strategy. The strategy has shortlisted unlimited conditions
conducive to the spread of terrorism such as, “prolonged unresolved
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conflicts - dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations - lack of rule of law and violation of human rights - ethnic,
national, and religious discrimination - political exclusion, socio-economic
marginalization and lack of good governance.” Finding solutions for the
root causes of terrorism, in addition to understanding the common tactics
of prison radicalization being employed across the continent, is essential
to prevent its spread. Furthermore, in order to limit the magnitude and
scope of radicalization in prisons worldwide we need two things. First,
more research focusing on the efficacy of preventive methods is needed.
Second, the international community needs to implement and respect
rules of law.
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